Kerala High Court cites Quran, rules divorced Muslim women can claim maintenance beyond personal law limits

Justice Kauser Edappagath was hearing a revision petition challenging a 2012 order of a family court in Palakkad, which had declined maintenance to a divorced Muslim woman under Section 125 (Order for maintenance of wives, children and parents) CrPC on the ground that her former husband had already fulfilled his obligations under Muslim personal law.

“Holy Quran, the foremost source of Muslim law, imposes an obligation on the Muslim husband to make provision for or to provide maintenance to the divorced wife. The verse (Ayat) 241 of the Holy Quran reads- And for the divorced woman (also) a provision (should be made) with fairness (in addition to dower): (this is) a duty (incumbent) on the reverent,” said the court.

The couple got married in January 2010. The marriage ended in divorce in July 2010 through the pronouncement of talaq.

On the same day, the parties entered into an agreement recording that the husband had paid Rs 35,000 towards maintenance for the ‘iddat’ period and Rs 1 lakh as ‘matah’, and that the wife would not claim any future maintenance.

‘Iddat’ period is the waiting period that a Muslim woman must observe after a marriage ends, whether by divorce or the death of her husband.

‘Matah’ means provision or maintenance to be paid by the husband to the wife at the time of divorce.

Subsequently, the woman and her minor daughter filed a maintenance petition under Section 125 CrPC.

The family court in 2012 granted maintenance to the child, it rejected the woman’s claim, holding that she was barred from invoking Section 125 CrPC after having received the amounts payable under the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986.

Advocates G Sreekumar and K Ravi, appearing for the petitioners argued that the right of a divorced Muslim woman to claim maintenance under Section 125 CrPC does not stand extinguished merely because the husband has paid amounts under the 1986 Act.

They contended that the family court was duty-bound to examine whether the amount paid was sufficient for the woman’s sustenance and whether she could maintain herself.

The counsel submitted that the sum of Rs 1 lakh paid as matah was wholly inadequate to provide for the woman’s future livelihood, particularly given her young age at the time of divorce.

The husband, represented by advocate CM Kammappu opposing the submissions said that once his statutory and personal law obligations had been discharged, no further claim for maintenance under CrPC was maintainable.

The bench said that the Muslim Women Protection Act, 1986, is a declaratory law codifying and recognising pre-existing rules of Muslim law regarding rights and obligations of divorced persons.

“The Parliament, while enacting the law based on the above Quranic verse, seems to have intended that the divorced woman gets sufficient means of livelihood after the divorce, and, therefore, the word ‘provision’ indicates that something is provided in advance for meeting her needs,” said the court.

In other words, at the time of divorce, the Muslim husband is required to contemplate the future needs and make preparatory arrangements in advance for meeting those needs, the bench added.

Holding that the family court had failed to assess both the adequacy of the amount paid and the woman’s ability to maintain herself, the high court set aside the order.

The court finding it prima facie difficult to accept that a one-time payment of Rs 1 lakh could suffice as lifetime provision for a woman who was only 17 years old at the time of divorce remanded the matter back to the family court in Palakkad, for fresh consideration of the divorced woman’s maintenance claim in accordance with law.

The court also directed reconsideration of the quantum of maintenance awarded to the minor child and asked the family court to dispose of the case expeditiously, noting that the proceedings date back to 2010.

Taking note that the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 does not expressly override or nullify the remedy available under Section 125 CrPC.

Referring to binding precedent, the court observed that the rights under the secular maintenance law and the personal law statute “co-exist in their distinct domains” and must be harmoniously construed.

The court further clarified that the husband, if opposing such a claim, must establish not only that he has fulfilled his obligations under personal law but also that, in light of those payments, the divorced woman is financially capable of maintaining herself.

Justice Edappagath on December 3 also emphasised that the concept of “reasonable and fair provision” under the 1986 Act is intended to secure the future livelihood of a divorced Muslim woman and cannot be reduced to a token amount.