Key takeaways

  • The OpenAI-Hugging Face incident⁠(opens in a new window) was a watershed moment for cybersecurity because it gave a peek into how the…
  • In this post, I’ll share what we’re doing to defend OpenAI, concrete steps other organizations can take today, and why now is the time to…
  • The same AI capabilities give defenders new ways to find and fix those weaknesses, but they need to move now.

What happened

The OpenAI-Hugging Face incident⁠(opens in a new window) was a watershed moment for cybersecurity because it gave a peek into how the capabilities of a typical threat actor will evolve in upcoming months. I’ve spoken with many organizations over the past few weeks, and one theme is clear: they know they need to fundamentally uplevel their cybersecurity practices with unprecedented speed.

I hadn’t configured my DNS records to prevent attackers from forging emails from me; my site used an insecure version of jQuery; Cloudflare was forwarding requests to AWS over unencrypted HTTP. I then asked ChatGPT Work to fix these issues, which it did over the course of an hour.

It opened the Cloudflare control panel in my browser, and proceeded to click many buttons to configure DNS, TLS, and advanced security settings correctly; it dropped jQuery entirely from the site; it migrated me off of AWS and onto Cloudflare Pages; it began a phased rollout of DMARC⁠(opens in a new window). And this was just my personal website.

This is a small example of how our existing models can operate as a cyberguardian—finding the long tail of issues that a human wouldn’t have time or expertise (many of the settings it fixed are ones I’m vaguely familiar with, but wouldn’t know offhand the right way to configure them) to get to, and then fixing them with an appropriately tuned rollout plan.

The Hugging Face incident showed that we underestimated the real-world cyber capabilities of our AI models. We are strengthening our safety requirements accordingly, which in turn adds even more urgency to our existing safety research and internal security work. I’m sharing a bit about our approach to securing OpenAI in this moment, in the hopes it’ll be useful to other organizations.

To protect OpenAI, we are investing significantly in both foundational controls—doing the basics correctly—and empowering our defenses through frontier intelligence. There are four major pillars to this strategy. First, we are using our models to help secure our code. Codex, including our security plugin, validates code changes, identifies vulnerabilities, and helps developers fix issues before they are deployed.

Why it matters

In this post, I’ll share what we’re doing to defend OpenAI, concrete steps other organizations can take today, and why now is the time to act. AI models developed around the world are increasingly able to automate parts of real-world cyberattacks, making longstanding security gaps—from bugs buried deep in human-written software to forgotten permissions—easier to find and exploit.

The same AI capabilities give defenders new ways to find and fix those weaknesses, but they need to move now. If companies act decisively—including improving their fundamentals and superpowering their teams with AI—we can make the internet more secure than it has ever been.

In the OpenAI-Hugging Face Incident, an agentic collective was able to autonomously penetrate not just OpenAI research infrastructure but also the production infrastructure of another company, chaining together vulnerabilities ranging from previously-unknown security flaws to using credentials to user accounts that had been leaked onto the internet.

It is increasingly clear that the tech debt⁠(opens in a new window) of every company masks significant flaws, and defenders need to find and fix them before attackers do. To advantage defenders relative to attackers, earlier this year we began releasing our cyber capabilities only to trusted defenders. Since then, various companies have released open weight models with cyber capabilities only a few months behind the frontier.

The most recent of these models appears slated to be released⁠(opens in a new window) at the end of August, and seems likely to significantly accelerate the threat landscape. While AI-powered attackers will soon be able to find longstanding flaws in many existing systems, AI will also make it much easier for defenders to find, prioritize, and fix those same flaws.

Security is still a cat-and-mouse game, but AI may shift its economics⁠(opens in a new window) in ways that fundamentally advantage defenders. For example, we are starting to train our models specifically to write superhumanly secure code. Our models are also incredible at mathematical proofs, which can be applied to formally verify the security of software in a way that has proven intractable for humans. com⁠(opens in a new window).

It’s a simple static site, hosted on AWS with Cloudflare as a frontdoor, so I figured there wouldn’t be much surface area for vulnerabilities. In about 15 minutes, it uncovered 13 issues, many of which probably aren’t exploitable on their own—but I could imagine them being chained together with other vulnerabilities to significant effect.

What to watch

It is an anti-goal to simply produce more security findings that need human validation; the objective is to catch real vulnerabilities before they ship and to shorten the path from discovering an issue to safely deploying a fix. As we continue to train our models to produce increasingly secure code, our goal is to eliminate some classes of software vulnerabilities for newly-authored code.

Second, we are putting our models to work defending our infrastructure continuously. Today, almost all of our initial security alerts are triaged by intelligence before humans are looped in.