What does the SHANTI Bill change? | Explained

Parliament has cleared the Sustainable Harnessing and Advancement of Nuclear Energy in India (SHANTI) Bill, despite Opposition demands for amendments and review by a Select Committee. To achieve India’s energy security needs, the government has boosted the Nuclear Energy Mission with ₹20,000 crore dedicated to Small Modular Reactors and advanced pressurised water reactors. India’s nuclear power sector has remained State-controlled and unchanged since 1956. The private and foreign partnership has been restricted under earlier laws — the Atomic Energy Act, 1962, and the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damages Act, 2010. Private and Foreign companies avoided India due to its strict liability laws.

The SHANTI Bill is an overarching legislation that opens India’s nuclear power sector to private and foreign participation, which was earlier entirely State-controlled and deeply regulated. Under the Bill, private Indian companies can seek licences to own, build, and operate nuclear power plants. It is also open for foreign supplier participation.

The SHANTI Bill allows up to 49% private participation, while maintaining 51% government control over sensitive activities such as nuclear fuel production, heavy water manufacturing, radioactive waste management, safety mechanisms, licensing, and strategic oversight.

The Bill ends the monopoly of Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited (NPCIL) in plant operations. It allows private companies and joint ventures to build, own, and operate nuclear power plants. The private sector will be involved in fuel fabrication, equipment manufacturing, plant operations, and research and development. It will essentially be a public-private partnership model aimed at attracting private capital with government oversight.

The Bill facilitates advanced nuclear technologies by enabling private participation and regulatory clarity. It supports the deployment of Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) and indigenous reactor designs, contributing to the clean energy transition and long-term energy security.

The Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB), constituted in 1983 under the Atomic Energy Act, has now been given statutory status and is answerable to Parliament rather than solely to the executive.

The AERB is responsible for ensuring nuclear safety, radiation protection, emergency preparedness, and quality assurance across civilian nuclear installations. It issues safety measures, licences and standards; administers industrial safety provisions of the Factories Act, 1948, for units under the Department of Atomic Energy as per Section 23 of the Atomic Energy Act and conducts inspections to prevent radiation hazards. It plays a crucial role in strengthening regulatory oversight under the SHANTI Bill due to increased private sector participation. However, the Bill has been criticised for concentrating power in one institution.

The Bill does not explicitly permit foreign direct investment in the nuclear power sector. The private companies will have to seek authorisation from the AERB. Authorisations are required for setting up a plant range from production, possession, to disposal of radioactive material and radiation generation equipment, as well as for establishing, operating, or withdrawing radioactive facilities.

The government controls the reprocessing and management of spent fuel and high-level radioactive waste; production and upgradation of heavy water; enrichment and isotopic separation of radioactive substances. The law also provides for the establishment of a nuclear liability fund to meet compensation needs in case of nuclear accidents.

Compared to the earlier regime, the SHANTI Bill ensures that the liability aspect is transparent and predictable for operators.  Liability caps are fixed as follows: ₹3,000 crore for large plants of 3,600 MW capacity; ₹1,500 crore for medium plants of 1,500-3,600 MW; and ₹100 crore for Small Modular Reactors of 150 MW capacity. Penalties for legal violations in cases of severe breach are capped at ₹1 crore.

The Union government will bear liability beyond the operator’s cap, with additional support from the proposed nuclear liability fund. Earlier, operators could hold suppliers liable for defective parts, faulty equipment, design inefficiency, and deliberate acts causing damage. The current Bill removes supplier accountability completely.

The Centre aims to strengthen India’s energy security by diversifying the power mix, reducing dependence on fossil fuels and fuel imports, and expanding atomic energy capacity.

Energy security is one of the main aims for boosting India’s development index. It ensures 24x7 baseload power as compared to solar energy and wind energy, which are subject to geographical conditions. It will be a boost for the energy sector, which is still heavily dependent on coal. It also ensures an enhancement for technology and the economy.

Nuclear power ensures clean energy with very low carbon emissions. It facilitates achieving India’s net-zero targets for 2070. The Bill may also revive the stalled civil nuclear deals with the U.S., France, and Japan, reduce dependence on Russia alone, and enhance India’s image as a responsible global nuclear player.

India struggles with solar, wind, and hydro energy due to its geographical and climate variables and still majorly relies on coal for electricity generation. Storage and grid integration costs for renewables remain high.

Thus, having sufficient baseload generation capacity is mandatory for an affordable and unrestricted supply. In order to achieve energy security for the growing economy, India has to strengthen and expand its nuclear energy sector. Moreover, the electricity mix must have enough baseload generation capacity in order to make it affordable and reliable for consumers. Nuclear power plants are one of the most effective in ensuring this.

India has a largely indigenous nuclear power programme based on a fuel cycle that aims to utilise India’s vast thorium reserves. Currently, India manages 25 nuclear reactors in seven power plants — 21 pressurised heavy water reactors and four light water reactors — all managed by NPCIL.

According to R.B. Grover, distinguished Professor Emeritus at the Homi Bhabha National Institute and member of the Atomic Energy Commission, as India does not have enough uranium, the Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited has mastered the design and operation of pressurised heavy water reactors. The Bhabha Atomic Research Centre has developed technologies to reprocess spent fuel to recover valuable materials and handle nuclear waste. In that sense, India is independent and self-sufficient in its nuclear power generation. India has operationalised the fast breeder reactor for thorium use.

The Opposition argues that the Bill dilutes accountability by allowing profit-driven private participation while placing liability on the State and society. There is a fear of repeating incidents like the Bhopal Gas tragedy, where accountability and remuneration were evaded by the foreign firms in spite of recourse to civil courts; moreover, such recourse is unavailable according to the new Law. Removing supplier liability and capping operator liability and penalties at a nominal cost, as compared to the actual volume and expanse of damages, is considered unreasonable. The ‘polluter pays’ principle has been undermined, and this compromises public safety. Private firms have no liability for accident costs, public safety issues and long-term risks. The cap on operator liability does not change in 15 years despite inflation or long-term assessment of health, environment, livelihood cost of any serious accident.

The cases such as Fukushima and Chernobyl point out the huge expense of liability. In the case of the Fukushima disaster, the actual civil damages were 700 times more than the cap proposed by the SHANTI bill.

Section 39 of the Bill seeks to override the RTI Act of 2005. It has raised several concerns as it seeks to remove public interest review and public appeal mechanisms. This will make the most crucial nuclear sector-related information — including plant details, operations, mechanisms, regulatory submissions and data on nuclear materials — ‘restricted’. This dilutes the transparency and questions the public accountability of the proposed system. The RTI Act 2005, in its wisdom, already exempts revealing information regarding India’s security, national interest, commercial information, and personal data. But these exemptions are subject to justification in cases of public accountability and public interest.

Section 42 overrides occupational safety, health and working conditions for nuclear facilities. Nuclear workers are removed from the country’s general labour safety framework. This has triggered opposition from ten central trade unions, including the Samyukta Kisan Morcha and the National Coordination Committee of Electricity Employees and Engineers, who have termed the Bill “draconian.”

The Opposition insists that the Bill is vendor-driven despite India’s self-reliance in nuclear technology. It argues that India has deep thorium reserves, around which nuclear reactors were built, which should be utilised. The Opposition demands that the private companies be compelled to install India’s technology.

The Bill lacks provisions for mandatory public hearings, environmental impact assessment disclosures, community consent mechanisms, regular public reporting of safety inspections, or Parliamentary scrutiny.

The Opposition also cited the example of France, where all nuclear reactors are under government control. The Bill is criticised for being pro-profit, pro-oligarch, catering to the crony capitalists while gambling with public safety.

Saee Pande is a freelance writer with a focus on politics, current affairs, international relations, and geopolitics