The Year Ahead: Wheels With Wheels

In our rapidly changing world, amid a geopolitical transformation driven by the unravelling of long-held partnerships, India’s foreign policy mandarins face quite the juggling act, in 2026.

India’s diplomatic calendar is packed, to begin with, with visits expected by German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, French President Emmanuel Macron, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President Antonio Costa. And that’s just in the first two months, even as India hosts the AI Impact Summit and takes on the rotating BRICS presidency.

The visit of the two European Union (EU) leaders in January is expected to lead to the signing of a long-gestating free-trade agreement between India and the 27-member European bloc. Described as one of the largest trade deals in decades, it could set the tone for the year. But foreign ministry officials, who have worked tirelessly on the FTA with counterparts in other departments, will have little time to celebrate as their focus shifts to other, more-challenging relationships.

The biggest foreign policy-related development in 2025 was the unprecedented strain that hit India-US relations as President Donald Trump slapped Indian goods with a 50% tariff, tightened visa regimes, and moved away from many of the strengths of a relationship built up by Republican and Democratic administrations alike over two-and-a-half decades. The cost in terms of trust between New Delhi and Washington has been tremendous.

With no clarity yet on the finalisation of an India-US bilateral trade deal, much of the speculation is now centred on how much of such an agreement would hinge on Trump, who has shown no signs of backing away from his demands in strategically sensitive sectors such as agriculture. The arrival this month of Trump’s hand-picked ambassador to India, Sergio Gor, could help ease matters forward, even as the two sides try to retain a semblance of normalcy in bilateral ties by continuing with established mechanisms in areas such as defence, technology and multilateral cooperation.

Though Trump has spoken of visiting China next April, there is still no word on whether he will travel to India – a trip crucial for the holding of the next summit of the Quad.

“Despite the current uncertainties on the US approach to China, the US has internalised that its main global economic, technological and military competitor is China, and that will influence many of its policy choices,” Arun Singh, who served as India’s envoy to the US in 2015-16, points out, offering hope amid the uncertainty.

Sameer Patil, a Mumbai-based security expert, points to the possibility of a change in the approach of the US administration after the mid-term elections, which are currently projected to produce a setback for Trump. Patil also points to growing concern within the US electorate over the President’s economic policies.

Meanwhile, India’s relationship with China has stabilised since October 2024, when the two sides reached an understanding on ending the military face-off in Ladakh that began in 2020. Steps such as the resumption of direct flights and easing of visas for Chinese nationals have helped. But several underlying areas of concern remain.

Despite the withdrawal of frontline forces from the Line of Actual Control, the two countries have close to 50,000 troops each arrayed in the region, and China has continued its efforts to enhance its influence both in India’s neighbourhood and across the Indo-Pacific.

China’s close alliance with Pakistan — with numerous reports of Chinese assistance to Pakistan’s military during the four-day conflict with India in May — and its growing footprint in Bangladesh, which has seen widespread chaos and unrest in recent weeks, remain a concern for policymakers in Delhi.

“The neighbourhood could become the bigger challenge for India in 2026,” says Patil. “Besides the unrest and anti-India sentiment in Bangladesh, we aren’t seeing a complete return to normalcy in Nepal. And then there’s Pakistan.”

West Asia, where India has had to balance its burgeoning relationship with Israel with a nuanced approach to the Gaza crisis to assuage important partners in the Arab world, also has the potential to pose a challenge, despite the steady strengthening of bilateral ties with key regional players such as the UAE, Qatar and Oman, with which India signed a comprehensive economic partnership agreement in December.

The situation became further complicated in September, with the signing of a mutual defence agreement between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, one of India’s largest energy suppliers and home to almost three million Indian expatriates.

“In terms of strategic and security issues, there will be challenges such as the Saudi Arabia-Pakistan mutual defence pact. These are issues India will have to navigate carefully, as they may even have an impact on the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor and other connectivity projects,” Ausaf Sayeed, who was India’s ambassador to Saudi Arabia in 2019-22, says. It doesn’t help that Islamabad reportedly plans to contribute troops to an international stabilisation force in Gaza.

Even India’s BRICS presidency could get thorny. If Trump’s efforts to end the war in Ukraine do not produce results early in the year, India could find itself asked, once again, to pick sides.

All in all, it looks set to be a more complex game of wheels within wheels this year.