The Truth About Europe’s Regulation of Digital Platforms

US President Donald Trump claims that Europeans are engaging in "censorship" when they require digital platforms to be transparent about their algorithms and to remove already illegal content. With the US recently barring entry to five Europeans it accuses of regulating online content, it is time to set the record straight.

PARIS – The Trump administration’s recent decision to prohibit five European officials from entering the United States has drawn attention, once again, to the European Union’s digital regulations. Among those barred is Thierry Breton, a former European commissioner who has supposedly engaged in “censorship” against American tech platforms. Such extraordinary charges demand a response that sets the record straight about what European regulation actually does, and why it is necessary.

For starters, the accusation of censorship fundamentally misunderstands – or misrepresents – European law. In fact, there is no content regulation at the EU level. What we have are rules to ensure that digital markets remain open and competitive, and that digital infrastructures operate with transparency and accountability. This distinction matters, and it is often deliberately obscured by those seeking to present our approach as restrictive, rather than protective.

European countries have different histories that shape how we think about freedom and responsibility. We have fought for our freedoms – some of us against fascism, others against communism, and still others to build democracy after long periods of dictatorship – and these struggles taught us concrete lessons about what happens when power goes unchecked, when manipulation replaces dialogue, and when space for independent thought is systematically eroded.

This shared understanding underpins the EU, which exists not to impose uniformity, but to protect what we fought for and to respect our diversity. The European Digital Markets Act and Digital Services Act adhere to this legacy. Neither regulates content. The DMA aims to keep digital markets open and contestable by preventing big tech companies from abusing their dominant positions. The DSA establishes obligations for transparency in digital infrastructure, not by dictating what can be said, but by holding platforms accountable for how they operate.

Specifically, the DSA does three things. First, content that is illegal within an EU member state – as determined by our own democratic legal systems – must be removed, and the sender notified. This is not censorship, but a straightforward application of existing law.

Second, digital systems must undergo risk assessments to determine if they pose significant dangers, such as to the mental health of young people or to the integrity of democratic processes. Private commercial choices have profound public consequences when algorithms are designed to maximize engagement through polarization, when recommendation systems create filter bubbles that fragment our shared reality, and when business models depend on keeping users anxious or outraged.

Third, if you operate a platform, you must know your customers, inform them of their rights, and explain how they can seek redress when things go wrong. This is basic consumer protection, extended to the digital realm.

These laws were not rushed through in a moment of panic. They were passed after nearly a decade of attempting other approaches: industry codes of conduct, best-practices guidance, and voluntary commitments. We legislated only when it became clear that self-regulation was insufficient.

We did so because we recognized an uncomfortable truth. We have allowed ourselves to be captured by big-tech platforms. For many Europeans, there is little meaningful choice online. A few American and Chinese companies mediate most of our digital lives, from our communications and access to information to our commercial transactions. This dependency is not natural or inevitable, and it poses risks that we can no longer ignore.

Europe must become more independent in the digital realm. That means enforcing our own laws with determination and consistency. The DMA and DSA are only as meaningful as our willingness to apply them, which we must do even when it annoys powerful interests. Sovereignty requires the sustained exercise of legitimate authority.

Moreover, we must actively support and use European alternatives where they exist or can be developed. This is not protectionism; genuine choice requires viable options. A market dominated by two or three global players is not a free one. It is an oligopoly.

Perhaps most fundamentally, we must ensure that our lives and our thinking are not entirely digitally dependent. Technology should serve us, not subordinate us. That means preserving spaces for direct human interaction, analog knowledge transmission, and forms of community and culture that exist independently of digital mediation. It also means teaching our children not just how to use technology, but how to think critically about it, how to recognize manipulation, and how to maintain the capacity for sustained attention and independent judgment.

The accusation of censorship ignores what is at stake. There is a profound difference between regulating infrastructure and regulating speech. When we require platforms to be transparent about their algorithms, to assess risks to democracy and mental health, to remove clearly illegal content while notifying those affected, we are not censoring. We are insisting that companies with unprecedented power over public discourse operate with some measure of public accountability.

This is not about opposing America or US companies. Many of us have deep respect for American achievements in technology and innovation, and we recognize the shared democratic values that have long united our societies. But we in Europe have a responsibility to Europeans – to protect the freedoms we fought for, to maintain the democratic systems we built, and to ensure that the digital transformation advances human flourishing rather than purely commercial purposes.

We have learned, through hard experience, that freedom requires more than the absence of government intervention. It requires positive conditions such as education, access to diverse sources of information, protection from manipulation and exploitation, and institutions that check concentrated power. Digital platforms are now among the most powerful institutions in our societies. The question is not whether they should be subject to rules, but whether those rules serve democratic values or merely private interests.

Europe’s approach is grounded in democratic legitimacy. The DMA and DSA were debated, amended, and enacted by our democratic institutions. We promised Europeans that their use of digital services would be safe, that their rights would be protected, and that the digital public sphere would remain compatible with democratic life.

We will enforce our laws, support our alternatives, and protect our digital, intellectual, and political independence, as outlined in the Europa Power Initiative’s Strasbourg Declaration. Our intent is not to build walls, but to maintain the foundations on which real freedom rests.

This commentary is co-authored by former European commissioners Mariya Gabriel and Nicolas Schmit, co-presidents of the Europa Power Initiative, and by Slavoj Žižek.