The election campaign in Hungary is in full swing almost four months before the actual vote. Independent pollsters show a 4–8% lead for the opposition center-right Tisza Party, while pollsters funded by the government report a commanding lead for Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz, which has been transforming the country for almost 16 years with a supermajority (constitutional majority). The only thing these pollsters agree on is the trend of the changes month after month.
Euronews asked Andrea Szabó, an academic researcher who studies how different groups integrate into Hungarian society.
Gábor Tanács, Euronews: Which voter groups supported Fidesz in '22, when it achieved its strongest election result?
Andrea Szabó: "In 2022, Fidesz was equally strong across all voter groups; there was not one where the party’s support was significantly lower than average. There were two groups where we saw a slight dip: one was support in the capital, and the other was among young people under 30. However, it could be said that in both cases, while support was lower, it was not dramatically so. Support for Fidesz was highest in villages and small towns, where the proportion of people with lower levels of education is higher and the population is older than average – though not necessarily elderly. However, overall support was so high that it offset the discrepancies seen in the data."
What happened to this voter coalition after 2022?
"In the summer of 2022, it became clear that the budget was untenable and needed to be redesigned. Although the Fidesz government never stated it directly, it was forced to introduce serious austerity measures. Inflation had already reached high levels in 2022, but it rose even further in 2023, with food inflation exceeding 25% in certain months—the most tangible economic indicator for ordinary people.
As a result of these austerity measures, so-called 'swing voters' began to distance themselves from Fidesz in 2022. These were the voters who had joined Fidesz during the final stretch of the campaign, primarily out of a fear of war. In 2023, inflation caused a significant portion of the so-called 'ring voters' to leave; these are people who define themselves as Fidesz supporters but need to be able to justify to themselves why they vote for the party.
By 2024, essentially only the core voters remained with Fidesz. These are identity-based voters who, once they rally behind a party, are very difficult to dislodge. The typical Fidesz voter today is older (at least 60 years old), lives in a small town, has a below-average education, and is more likely to be female and religious. This does not mean that all Fidesz voters fit this description, but the party's popularity has reached such a critical low among young people that the process of generational replacement within its support base has not only slowed down but essentially stalled."
In 2022, there was a sudden shift in the final period of the campaign that surprised independent pollsters: hundreds of thousands of voters decided at the last minute to vote for Fidesz. Could something similar happen in the current campaign?
"In May 2022, we conducted thorough research into voter motives and identified two essential reasons for Fidesz’s support: widespread pre-election financial incentives—including family subsidies and housing assistance—and the issue of the war. The war in Ukraine broke out in February, during the final stretch of the campaign. Our research—which was a social science study, not a standard poll—already showed a 5% lead for Fidesz in December 2021. Other reliable, independent pollsters showed similar results.
Therefore, the war did not determine whether Fidesz would win; that had already been decided by December 2021. In the final month and a half, the party mobilized swing voters who might not have gone to the polls at all if not for the war. So, the war did not decide the winner—it only determined the margin of victory and the sheer scale of that win.
The situation is completely different now. Our social science research and more traditional independent opinion polls show that the kind of 'autumn turnaround' previously characteristic of Fidesz campaigns—where they take the lead by November or December at the latest—is not visible in the current data."
What do the current trends show?
"Between August and the end of November 2025, Fidesz undoubtedly succeeded in halting the rise of the Tisza Party and improving its own position, with pollsters recording an increase of at least three percentage points in Fidesz support. However, December data indicate that Fidesz’s advance has stalled, and the gap between the two parties has not narrowed further. If this is true, it suggests that the financial transfers and announcements made so far are not having the same impact they did in 2021.
That said, I would like to point out that in January and February 2026, voters will begin receiving the transfers promised by Fidesz. This includes tax breaks for mothers, the six-month salary bonus for the armed forces—colloquially known as 'weapon money'—and wage increases of 10–15%. Not to mention the first weekly installment of the newly introduced '14th-month pension.' We will only be able to see the true effect of these financial incentives in February."
There seems to be a consensus that the election will be decided in small towns and villages, with a strong emphasis on local opinion leaders. In its studies, the Centre for Social Sciences refers to these individuals as the "locally integrated" group—a demographic that has traditionally supported Fidesz. Is there a visible shift in party preference among them?
"In Hungary, our research team, led by Imre Kovách, was the first to demonstrate the existence of a specific social stratum—we prefer the term 'integration group'—whose members serve as the leaders or organizers of their local environments, specifically in small settlements, towns, and villages.
This doesn’t just refer to the two or three most prominent figures, such as the mayor, the local MP, or a major entrepreneur. It also includes local opinion leaders like the hairdresser, the shopkeeper, or the butcher. These are individuals who maintain extensive social networks and spread information; they effectively filter the news they receive from television, radio, and the internet, 'translating' it into the language of the local community.
In 2021, this was one of Fidesz’s most stable voter groups. In contrast, during the 2024 municipal elections, many Fidesz-affiliated mayors who had been in power for decades in towns with populations of 10,000 to 20,000 were unseated. In their place, civic and opposition candidates took control. This may have been the result of a shift in voter preference within this 'locally integrated' group. We are currently working on this phase of our research, where we are looking beyond the primary data to examine our deep structural data. It would represent a seismic change in this segment if the support ratio were no longer 60–30% in favor of Fidesz, but rather closer to 50–50%. I cannot yet say for certain whether this is indeed the case."
I have a strong impression that there is an ongoing struggle to gain the support of independent village mayors who are not closely tied to Fidesz ideologically but who, as local leaders, are dependent on its favor as long as Fidesz remains in power. This is why there is constant maneuvering and competition to see which party can mobilize more people in Budapest; in the end, these rural leaders will side with whoever they believe is likely to win, and they will bring part of their communities with them.
It is no coincidence that Péter Magyar [leader of the Tisza Party] asserts in every other sentence that they are the majority. He wants to signal to these local leaders that while the Tisza Party knows they have stood behind Fidesz in the past and mobilized voters for them, things are changing. This mobilization is a fact; there is no point in denying it was the case. Péter Magyar’s message—which is a true projection of power—is: 'Do not stand behind Fidesz this time. You don’t even have to mobilize for Tisza; just don’t mobilize for Fidesz.' I always say—and excuse the crude analogy—that on election day, the mayor stands in front of his office, raises a finger to the air, and acts according to which way the wind is blowing. This represents a massive risk for both Fidesz and Tisza."
There are four months left until the election. What will determine the outcome, and what will be the most critical factors in these final four months?
"One of the most important milestones is just a week away: Christmas. It is the only time of year when people truly have time for one another; extended families gather, and a broad cross-section of society comes together. Current public issues are so weighty that they will inevitably surface during Christmas lunches and dinners.
Another critical factor is the development of the war—specifically, whether there will be a peace treaty and where it might be signed. If such a treaty were to be signed here in Hungary, with the participation of Presidents Putin, Zelensky, and Trump, it could have a significant impact on support for Fidesz and, specifically, on Viktor Orbán’s personal prestige. Such an event could swing voters back toward Fidesz.
The third factor is the occurrence of unexpected events. These are what truly drive a campaign, and there is no telling what might happen between now and April 12—or whenever the election is held.
The final, and perhaps most important, factor is mobilization on election day. Elections are always a competition of mobilization. Furthermore, it is not enough to simply increase your national vote count; you must outperform the opposition at the constituency level to secure victory. I believe that April or May 2026 will witness an unprecedented struggle for mobilization. Until then, I advise everyone to fasten their seatbelts, because we are in for a very bumpy ride over the next four months."