A year after the overthrow of Syria’s dictator, Bashar al-Assad, the former jihadi fighter turned Syrian president Ahmed al-Sharaa addressed the Doha Forum earlier this month, deftly parrying questions about his controversial past and outlining his country’s complex journey toward a participatory, rules-based system. As I listened, it struck me that, while Europe’s role in the Middle East has been severely damaged by its immoral stance on the Gaza war and its self-inflicted exclusion from Iran nuclear diplomacy, Europeans still have a role to play when it comes to its neighbours in the eastern Mediterranean.
Europe’s world has been turned upside down by Washington’s alignment with Moscow in the Ukraine war and the transatlantic rift as the Trump administration treats Europe as an adversary. Another dimension of this upheaval is Europe’s growing irrelevance in the Middle East. Only if Europeans accept that the past is behind them can they hope to regain a constructive independent role in the region.
After the Suez crisis in 1956, which marked the end of European colonial dominance in the Middle East, Europeans resigned themselves to playing second fiddle to the US. Yet, Washington called the shots, and European governments and public opinion did not always agree – most notably during the 2003 Iraq war. Still, the US usually invited Europe to support its initiatives and, ultimately, Europe would comply.
The social contract underpinning the transatlantic relationship, with Europe sheltered under the US security umbrella, made the bargain worthwhile. This did not mean European governments lacked agency in the Middle East. They played crucial roles during the Oslo peace process, supporting the Palestine Liberation Organization as the embryo of a state in the making. More impressively, European diplomacy patiently advanced multilateral efforts eventually leading to the Iran nuclear deal. On every occasion, however, Europe’s role – even when at odds with Washington’s – was aimed at supporting US leadership in the region while tempering its hegemonic excesses. Sometimes Europe succeeded; often it failed. But the political framework remained unchanged.
That framework no longer exists. Europe has withdrawn from the Middle East, consumed by war on its own continent. The Ukraine conflict has not only absorbed most of Europe’s foreign-policy bandwidth but also distorted its political perspective on the Middle East. Securing US support on Ukraine, especially under Donald Trump, has required uncritical acceptance of Washington’s regional policies, including the illegal bombing of Iran. Iran, long viewed as problematic due to its human rights abuses, proxy forces and nuclear programme, suddenly became an adversary in European eyes because of its strategic alignment with Russia.
For its part, the US no longer looks to Europe as its primary partner in the Middle East. With the rise of regional actors – particularly the Gulf states and Turkey – Washington now engages directly with Riyadh, Doha, Abu Dhabi or Ankara. Europe’s sidelining was already evident during Joe Biden’s administration, largely due to its self-inflicted irrelevance. Under Trump, this exclusion has become reflexive, as his administration seeks to push Europe further to the margins.
Regional players are not clamouring for Europe’s return. Most significantly, its stubborn and immoral refusal to leverage its influence to end Israel’s devastating war in Gaza has shattered what little credibility it had left. When the German chancellor, Friedrich Merz, candidly remarked that Israel was doing Europe’s “dirty work” in attacking Iran, the pretence fell away. Europe was no longer accused of double standards; with few exceptions – such as Spain, Norway, Ireland and occasionally France – it was seen as having no standards at all. There was neither leverage nor principle: Europe had simply been erased from the map.
Today, any hope of a durable ceasefire in Gaza, or even progress toward a Palestinian state, does not stem from European efforts. European leaders continue to hide behind Trump’s peace plan, avoiding any leverage they may exert over Israel.
The limited hope that exists comes from Qatar’s mediation, with Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Egypt playing critical roles. Similarly, if US-Iran diplomacy resumes in the future, European governments will not lead the process. The E3 grouping – France, Germany and the UK – undermined its own position by triggering the “snapback” of UN sanctions on Iran, effectively ending the nuclear deal, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, they had helped broker.
Any progress now depends on convergence between the Gulf states and Iran, particularly Saudi Arabia’s potential role in facilitating talks between Washington and Tehran. In short, on the Middle East’s most pressing issues – the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Iran – Europe’s governments can, at best, support Gulf efforts to influence Trump. That support matters, especially in Gaza, where a fragile ceasefire could collapse if Trump’s plan stalls. But Europe’s role in the region has been reduced to a third-tier status.
Yet the Middle East remains Europe’s neighbour, and it would be naive to assume Europeans can remain indefinitely disengaged. With its room for manoeuvre shrunken, Europe should focus on the wider Levant – specifically Lebanon, Iraq and Syria. All three countries are extremely vulnerable. Lebanon is navigating a complex reform process, with the constant threat of war looming as Israel continues to occupy five outposts in the country. Iraq has managed to stay out of the region’s recent convulsions, striving for a delicate balance as it seeks greater autonomy without antagonising Tehran. Syria remains fragile as it attempts to reconcile justice and social cohesion while facing an expansionist and aggressive Israel.
With the exception of Syria, where Trump has shown some interest – culminating in al-Sharaa’s visit to Washington – the US is not particularly engaged in Lebanon or Iraq. And while regional actors are essential, whether for their security influence (such as Turkey’s in Syria) or economic support (such as the Gulf’s), there is a vacuum that Europe could help fill. With the international liberal order in disarray, governance support may no longer be in vogue, but it is in demand in the Levant. This is where Europe can still make a constructive contribution.
